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Abstract 
 
How well do countries cope with the aftermath of natural disasters? In particular, do 
international financial flows help buffer countries in the wake of disasters? This paper 
focuses on hurricanes (one of the most common and destructive types of disasters), 
and examines the impact of hurricane exposure on resource flows to developing 
countries. Using meteorological data on storm paths, I construct a time-varying storm 
index that takes into account the fraction of a country’s population exposed to storms 
of varying intensities. Across developing countries, greater hurricane exposure leads 
to large increases in foreign aid. For other types of international financial flows, the 
impact of hurricanes varies according to income level. In the poorer half of the 
sample, hurricane exposure leads to substantial increases in migrants’ remittances, so 
that total inflows from all sources in the three years following hurricane exposure 
amount to roughly three-fourths of estimated damages. In the richer half of the 
sample, by contrast, hurricane exposure stimulates inflows of new lending from 
multilateral institutions, but offsetting declines in private financial flows are so large 
that the null hypothesis of zero damage replacement cannot be rejected. 
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1 Introduction
Natural disasters cause tremendous losses of human life, as well as substantial economic damages.
From 1970 to 2002, natural disasters killed an estimated 2.74 million people, injured another 2.70
million, and led to US$987 billion in economic damages worldwide (see Table 1).1 Individual
disasters, too, can have appalling tolls; the 1970 hurricane in Bangladesh killed some 300,000
people. It is not uncommon for estimated economic losses from disasters to amount to substantial
fractions of countries’ economic output. For example, damages from the 1973 drought in Burkina
Faso amounted to 104% of gross domestic product, while those from Hurricane Mitch in Honduras
in 1998 came to 38% of GDP. More generally, 39% of world population lives in countries that had
experienced disaster damages of 3% of GDP or more in some year between 1970 and 2002.
Given the destructive power of many natural events, and their largely unpredictable nature,
it is important to understand how countries cope with the aftermath of disasters. This paper
examines how international financial flows buﬀer the economic losses from natural disasters. In
particular, I focus on the impact of hurricanes, one of the most common and destructive types of
disasters.2 Wind storms, the disaster type that includes hurricanes, caused an estimated 612,000
deaths, 520,000 injuries, and US$280 billion in damages worldwide from 1970 to 2002.
A key contribution of this paper is to take a worldwide view in examining systematically the
impact of hurricanes on international financial flows to developing countries. I examine several
types of flows–oﬃcial development assistance (ODA), lending from multilateral institutions,
bank and trade-related lending, migrants’ remittances, foreign direct investment, and portfolio
investment–and estimate the responses of such flows to hurricane exposure, on average across
all countries for which data are available. This topic has received only limited prior attention,
typically consisting of studies of the impact of a small number of disasters in a limited set of
countries (Albala-Bertrand 1993, Benson and Clay 2004).
Past analyses of the impact of hurricanes on international financial flows have been hampered
by the lack of objective data on hurricane exposure at the country-year level. Data do exist on
damages from storms, but such data are reported by national governments or other organizations
and may be influenced by the desire to attract financial inflows. For example, damage estimates
may be exaggerated when international inflows are expected to be small, leading estimates of
1All figures in this paragraph are compiled from estimates in EM-DAT: the OFDA/CRED International Disaster
Database. Damage figures are in 1995 US dollars. Population figures are for 2001, from World Development
Indicators 2004.
2While ‘hurricanes’ typically refer to events in the Atlantic and eastern Pacific, I use the term in this paper to
encompass similar events that are known elsewhere as ‘typhoons’ and ‘tropical cyclones’.
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the impact of damage on financial flows to be understated. In addition, unobserved third factors
may influence both international flows and the size of damages suﬀered (if disasters occur), also
potentially leading to biased estimates.
An innovation of this paper is its use of a time-varying storm index that takes into account
the fraction of a country’s population exposed to storms of varying intensities. The index is
constructed using meteorological data on storm paths and intensities, combined with newly-
available data on the subnational distribution of population. The index is highly predictive of
disaster damages and human losses experienced by countries in particular years.
Across developing countries, greater hurricane exposure leads to large increases in foreign aid.
For other types of international financial flows, the impact of hurricanes varies according to income
level. In the poorer half of the sample, hurricane exposure also leads to substantial increases in
migrants’ remittances, and a slightly oﬀsetting decline in bank and trade-related lending. For
this poor-country subsample, instrumental variables estimates indicate that total inflows from
all sources in the three years following hurricane exposure amount to roughly three-fourths of
estimated damages. In the richer half of the sample, by contrast, hurricane exposure stimulates
inflows of new lending from multilateral institutions, but oﬀsetting declines in private financial
flows are so large that the null hypothesis of zero damage replacement cannot be rejected.
This paper is part of a nascent literature on the economics of disasters. Kahn (2005) exam-
ines heterogeneity in the impact of natural disasters on disaster deaths, focusing on the role of
institutions in moderating death tolls. Anbarci, Escaleras, and Register (forthcoming) document
that fatalities from earthquakes are greater in countries that are poorer and that have higher
inequality. Bluedorn (2005) uses Caribbean hurricanes to test the intertemporal approach to
current account determination. Bluedorn and Cascio (2005) study the impact of a hurricane in
Puerto Rico on education and intergenerational mobility.3
Two highly related bodies of research are those on risk-coping mechanisms used by individual
households in rural communities, on the one hand, and by countries, on the other. There is
substantial microeconomic evidence on the methods used by households to cope with risk in
developing countries. An empirical approach frequently taken is to examine how specific risk-
coping mechanisms (such as transfer receipts, borrowing, asset sales, or savings accumulation or
decumulation) respond to shocks. This paper shares this empirical approach. Studies frequently
3While not explicitly about disasters per se, Miguel, Satyanath, and Shanker (2004) is also related in that it
uses rainfall shocks to instrument for economic growth in estimating the impact of growth on civil conflict. Paxson
(1992) examines the impact of rainfall shocks on household savings in rural Thailand.
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document some ability to smooth consumption, but also find that there is far from complete
smoothing (see, for example, Townsend (1995), Udry (1994), and Ligon, Thomas, and Worall
(2002)).
On the other hand, research in international finance typically concludes that there is relatively
little smoothing of national-level consumption via international risk-sharing arrangements or ex
post smoothing mechanisms, such as French and Poterba (1991), Tesar (1993, 1995), Lewis (1996),
and Van Wincoop (1999).4 By contrast, this paper finds that specific types of international flows
do respond positively to disaster events, replacing a large fraction of losses within a few years of a
disaster. The diﬀerence between this paper’s results and previous findings in international finance
may reflect the fact that disasters are truly exogenous events, so that moral hazard problems that
may inhibit the operation of consumption smoothing mechanisms in the face of other types of
risks are not an issue for disasters.
Positive responses of international flows to hurricanes are likely to reflect a combination of
both ex ante risk-sharing and ex post consumption smoothing. For example, the response of work-
ers’ remittances to disaster losses may be due to ex ante risk-sharing agreements via reciprocal
transfers among relatives living in diﬀerent countries. Transfers and credits from overseas indi-
viduals, governments, and institutions (appearing in the data as remittances, ODA, and lending
from multilateral institutions) could also simply reflect desires, ex post, to assist those aﬀected by
disasters. On the other hand, if disasters lead to declines in expected rates of return or increases
in risk perceptions, private asset sales (FDI, portfolio investment) and commercial credit could
subsequently decline.
Finally, this paper’s findings on the response of migrants’ remittances to disaster damage relate
to research on migration as a risk-coping mechanism for households in poor countries. Rosenzweig
and Stark (1989) document the risk-reducing aspects of the spatial distribution of daughters after
marriage in rural India. At the international level, it is commonly posited that remittance flows
from overseas buﬀer economic shocks in the migrants’ home countries (for example, Ratha 2003),
but this claim has been empirically untested until now.5
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on hur-
ricanes worldwide, and discusses the data on hurricanes. Section 3 considers the theoretical role
4However, there is evidence of risk-sharing and consumption smoothing within closely-tied economic regions
such as states in the US and countries in the EU. See, for example, Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha (1996) and
Asdrubali and Kim (2004).
5Although see Yang and Choi (2005) for microeconomic study of the impact of local rainfall shocks in the
Philippines on remittance inflows.
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of international financial flows flows in sharing risk (in particular, disaster risk) across countries.
Section 4 discusses relevant econometric issues and presents the empirical evidence. Section 5
discusses the magnitude of the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Hurricanes: overview and data sources
2.1 What are hurricanes?
Hurricanes are severe storms that originate over tropical oceans.6 The term ‘hurricane’ is typically
used to describe severe tropical storms in the Atlantic and east Pacific, but the same type of event
is known as a ‘typhoon’ in the western Pacific and simply a ‘tropical cyclone’ in the Indian Ocean
and Oceania. A tropical storm is classed as a hurricane if sustains winds in excess of 74 miles
(119 kilometers) per hour.
Hurricanes only originate over warm tropical waters with a surface temperature of at least
79 degrees F (26 degrees C). Therefore, due to cooler sea surface temperatures, hurricanes never
form in the South Atlantic Ocean or the eastern South Pacific Ocean. In addition, formation
of hurricanes requires a zone of low barometric pressure in combination with rotating winds (a
‘vortex’), ruling out hurricane formation and persistence within 5 degrees of the equator: the
earth’s Coriolis force is too weak near the equator to generate suﬃcient rotating winds.
Figure 1 helps illustrate the typical architecture of a hurricane (it is an aerial view of Hurricane
Mitch approaching Honduras on October 26, 1998.) The center of a hurricane (the ‘eye’) is a
circular area of low pressure and calm air typically 20-30 miles (roughly 30-50 km.) in diameter.
Surrounding the eye are spiral arms of storm clouds. The spiral-shaped area of weather distur-
bance can be anywhere from 60-900 miles (roughly 100-1,500 km.) in diameter, but the area of
hurricane-force winds is typically smaller. Formation of hurricanes can take place over several
days, or as quickly as within 12 hours. Hurricanes will typically last 2-3 days, with the broader
storm (including periods with less than hurricane-force winds) lasting for 4-5 days in total.
Hurricanes wreak damage of three general types. First, hurricanes are accompanied by a
storm surge, a rise in the sea level due to wind-driven waves and low atmospheric pressure. Storm
surges can range from 4 feet (1.2 meters) for the smallest hurricanes to 18 feet (5.5 meters) or
more for the strongest ones. They are usually the most deadly aspect of hurricanes, and also cause
extensive property damage alongside destruction of crops and salt contamination of agricultural
6Much of the background description of hurricanes presented here is based on Smith (1992), Alexander (1993),
and Bryant (1991).
4
land. The storm surge caused by the 1970 Bangladesh hurricane was reported to have reached
30 feet (9 meters). Second, strong winds can cause substantial structural damage as well as
defoliation of crops. The third type of damage is from flooding due to heavy rainfall, which can
also cause landslides in sloped areas. While the storm surge and winds are strongest near the
eye of the hurricane, the eﬀects of flooding can be felt hundreds of miles away and can last well
beyond the dissipation of hurricane-force winds.
2.2 Hurricane data
In examining the impact of hurricanes on international financial flows, a focus on storm damage as
the measure of hurricane "aﬀectedness" would be problematic. Damage reports cannot plausibly
be taken, in and of themselves, as exogenous with respect to the outcomes of interest. For example,
reverse causation is likely to be a problem. If large financial inflows are occurring in response
to disasters, countries or international agencies have no need to exaggerate damage figures. But
when flows are not forthcoming, disaster damages may be exaggerated to attract more resources.
This would lead the estimated eﬀect of damage on financial inflows to be negatively biased. There
may also be omitted variable problems, as when worsening economic conditions or a breakdown
of government functions leads to declines in financial inflows and an increase in vulnerability
to disasters (perhaps due to deteriorating disaster warning systems, deteriorating infrastructure,
declines in property maintenance, etc.).
To deal with problems of reverse causation or omitted variables, this paper instead focuses
on a storm index created from objective meteorological data. Meteorological data on hurricanes
worldwide are available from two U.S. government agencies: the NOAA Tropical Prediction Cen-
ter (for Atlantic and eastern North Pacific hurricanes) and the Naval Pacific Meteorology and
Oceanography Center/Joint Typhoon Warning Center (for hurricanes in the Indian Ocean, west-
ern North Pacific, and Oceania). Via detailed post-event analysis, these agencies create what are
known as ‘best tracks’ of individual hurricanes: positions (latitude and longitude) of hurricane
centers at 6-hourly intervals, combined with intensity information (wind speed and barometric
pressure). These best tracks incorporate information from a variety of sources, such as reconnai-
sance aircraft, ships, and satellites. While best tracks may be reported as far back as 1851, the
data quality is likely to be highest since the early 1960s and the widespread use of meteorological
satellites (Chu et al 2002).7
7Detailed descriptions of these data files are provided in Jarvinen et al (1984), Davis et al (1984), and Chu et
al (2002). The data files from these two sources have been placed in a consistent format by Unisys Weather and
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Figure 2 shows an example of smoothed hurricane best tracks, with data for the western
North Pacific area in 1985. Figure 3 displays all 6-hour segments of hurricane best tracks that are
associated with hurricane-force winds, from 1949 to 2001. Hurricanes clearly manifest themselves
most prominently in tropical oceans, and tend to eventually lose force upon striking a continental
land mass (although some hurricanes may extend far inland). While hurricanes originate in the
tropics, they can often extend into temperate areas, as evidenced by the profusion of hurricanes
all along the U.S. Atlantic coast and the temperate coast of East Asia and Japan.
The best track data naturally take hurricanes as the unit of analysis, and so in their raw form
give no indication of the countries which may have been aﬀected. However, the empirical analysis
to follow will take place at country level, and on an annual basis (the unit of observation is a
country-year). I construct a storm index at the country-year level as follows.
The damage caused by hurricanes certainly depends on the intensity of the hurricane (in
particular, windspeed). In addition, hurricanes should cause more damage if they strike in areas
more highly concentrated in population. A storm index Hjt (for country j in year t) that takes
such considerations into account is as follows:
Hjt =
X
i
X
s
xisjt
Njt
where xisjt is a measure of how aﬀected a person i is by individual storm s in country j and
year t. The measure of "aﬀectedness" is the square of the windspeed above the tropical storm
windspeed threshold (33 knots), normalized by the maximum of this variable. Specifically, xisjt
is:
xisjt =
(wisjt − 33)2
(wMAX − 33)2
wisjt is the windspeed (in knots) to which an individual was exposed.8 wMAX is the maximum
windspeed observed in the data, 152.3 knots. Individual aﬀectedness is then summed across all
storms in a given year and across all individuals in the country. It is then divided by population
Njt to obtain a per-capita measure.
The storm index can be thought of as intensity-weighted events per capita. If each of a
country’s residents were exposed to the maximum windspeed (xisjt = 1 for all residents) on a
single occasion in a single year, Hjt = 1 for that country in that year. Also, Hjt = 1 if each
are publicly accessible at http://weather.unisys.com/hurricane/index.html.
8A knot is one nautical mile per hour, and a nautical mile is 1.15 statute or land miles.
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resident were exposed twice to a storm where xisjt = 0.5.
While there is no data source for individual-level hurricane aﬀectedness (xisjt), it is possible
to approximate the numerator in the formula for the storm index Hjt. First, I use available
subnational estimates of population in a 0.25-degree-square worldwide grid.9 Then, I estimate
the windspeed experienced at each gridpoint due to each separate storm using the storm best-
track data, a model of windspeed decay given distance from hurricane eyes (as in Dilley, et al
2005), and geographic information systems software. The summation then is across storms and
across gridpoints (instead of individuals), with each gridpoint weighted by population. Because
of inconsistent availability of windspeed data in initial years of data collection, I only construct
this index for countries in South Asia (aﬀected by North Indian Ocean storms) from 1979 and
onwards, Oceania (South Pacific storms) from 1983 onwards, and Southern Africa (South Indian
Ocean storms) from 1983 onwards. For storms in all remaining parts of the world (aﬀected by
West and East North Pacific and North Atlantic storms), windspeed data are available since the
1940s, so I construct the index for all years from 1970-2002.
Table 2 displays the mean storm index (for available years between 1970 and 2002 inclusive)
for each country in a hurricane-aﬀected region. The country with the highest mean storm index
is the Philippines, with 0.0287, followed by the Dominican Republic (0.0205), Jamaica (0.0129),
Haiti (0.0079), and Madagascar (0.0072).
3 The impact of disaster damage in theory
When a country experiences a major disaster, how should we expect international financial inflows
to change? A basic theoretical result is that if there is a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation of risk across
individual entities (in this case, individual countries) in a risk-sharing arrangement, individual
consumption should not be aﬀected by idiosyncratic income shocks.
Consider N countries, indexed by i. Countries have an uncertain income in each period t,
yist, depending on the state of nature st ∈ S. A representative household in country i consumes
cist, and experiences within-period utility of Ui
¡
cist
¢
at time t. Let utility be separable over time,
and let instantaneous utility be twice diﬀerentiable with U 0i > 0 and U 00i < 0. For the allocation
of risk across countries to be Pareto-eﬃcient, the ratio of marginal utilities between countries in
9These data are from the Gridded Population of the World (GPW) dataset, described in Balk and Yetman
(2004) and available at http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/gpw.
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any state of nature must be equal to a constant:
U 0i
¡
cist
¢
U 0j
¡
cjst
¢ = ωj
ωi
, for all i, j, st, and t,
where ωi and ωj are the Pareto weights of countries i and j. Countries’ marginal utilities are
proportional to each other, and so consumption levels between countries move in tandem.
Let utility be given by the following constant absolute risk aversion function:
Ui
¡
cist
¢
=
−e−θcist
θ
.
Then, following (among others) Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991), Altonji, Hayashi, and Kot-
likoﬀ (1992) and Townsend (1994), we can obtain a relationship between individual country i’s
consumption and average consumption across countries cst:
cist = cst +
lnωi − 1N
PN
j=1 lnωj
θ
(1)
Eﬃcient risk-sharing implies that individual countries’ consumption levels depend here only
on mean world consumption cst and an eﬀect determined by the country’s Pareto weight relative
to other countries’. Because this latter term is constant over time, then changes in consumption
for particular countries will depend only on the change in mean world consumption. Said another
way, countries face only aggregate global risk.
The key question is whether idiosyncratic risk or aggregate risk dominates in practice, as
this will determine the extent to which consumption can be smoothed. The empirical analysis to
follow will examine the impact of exposure to hurricanes, which are by their nature only local (not
global) phenomena. So in principle one might expect substantial ability of countries to smooth
consumption in the face of hurricane-related disaster risk. In addition, moral hazard problems
that often inhibit the operation of insurance and other risk-coping arrangements should be much
less of an issue for natural disasters: they are easily observable phenomena, and a country cannot
aﬀect its probability of being struck by one.
In practice, even if ex ante risk-sharing arrangements are incomplete, countries may also be
able to use ex post mechanisms to smooth consumption, such as international borrowing and
asset sales. Among others, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Kletzer (1984) and Grossman and Van
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Huyck (1988) have underlined the function of sovereign debt as an ex post smoothing device.10
Microeconomic studies have documented the role of asset sales as ex post smoothing devices, such
as Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), Lim and Townsend (1998), and Fafchamps, Udry, and Czukas
(1998). International transfers (ODA and remittances) may respond due to ex ante risk-sharing
arrangements, as well as ex post responses by overseas individuals and governments with purely
charitable motives. Microeconomic studies among households of the insurance and smoothing
role of gifts and remittances include Lucas and Stark (1985), Ravallion and Dearden (1988),
Rosenzweig and Stark (1989), Platteau (1991), and Cox, Eser, and Jimenez (1998). In addition,
inflows of new foreign direct investment could occur if asset destruction leads to increases in rates
of return on investment. An increase in FDI due to an increase in the rate of return is diﬀerent
from other risk-sharing or consumption smoothing responses, but in practice it also helps in
replacing lost assets. On the other hand, private asset sales (FDI, portfolio investment) and
commercial credit could decline in the wake of disasters, if disasters lead to declines in expected
rates of return or increases in perceived risk.
Adapting Fafchamps and Lund (2003), let consumption of country i in state st be the sum
of income yist, net inflows of unrequited transfers r
i
st , net borrowing b
i
st, and the change in assets
∆aist:
cist = y
i
st + r
i
st + b
i
st +∆a
i
st
So then we can rewrite equation (1) as:
rist + b
i
st +∆a
i
st = −y
i
st + cst +
lnωi − 1N
PN
j=1 lnωj
θ
(2)
This equation can be transformed into an empirically testable specification as follows. First,
separate income yist into:
yist = eyi − zist,
where eyi is the permanent component of income and zist is the transitory component of income.
Only the transitory component depends on the state of the world. Note that I define zist so that
larger amounts are bad for income, to correspond with the shock measure I will be using in the
empirics (hurricane exposure).
The function of Pareto weights and the permanent income component eyi can be captured by a
10And at the microeconomic level, see (for example) Townsend (1995), Udry (1994), and Rosenzweig (1988) for
evidence on credit as a consumption-smoothing mechanism.
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country fixed eﬀect γi. The mean world consumption level cst can be represented by a time eﬀect
φt. Also allow a random component εit, a mean-zero error term. Then equation (2) becomes:
rist + b
i
st +∆a
i
st = z
i
st + γi + φt + εit (3)
The empirical test of this paper will be based on equation (3), where the outcome variables are
net transfers, net borrowing, and asset changes separately. Specifically, the net transfer measures
will be net oﬃcial development assistance, and net remittances from overseas migrants. Net
borrowing will be lending from multilateral institutions as well as bank and trade-related private
lending. And asset changes will be represented by net foreign direct investment and portfolio
investment.
This paper will focus on a particular type of transitory shock zist, hurricane exposure. It is of
interest to examine which of the potential types of international financial flows–transfers, loans,
or asset sales–appear to respond positively to hurricane exposure. The empirical analysis will
test the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcient on inflows with respect to damages zist is equal to zero.
In addition, the estimates will be used to shed light on the fraction of disaster damages that are
replaced by international inflows (the "replacement rate" of damages by inflows).
4 Empirical evidence
This section documents the impact of hurricane exposure on international financial flows. I first
describe other data sources used in the empirical analysis, and then describe summary statistics.
The empirical results follow.
4.1 Other data sources
To examine the impact of hurricane exposure on disaster damages, I use data from EM-DAT:
the CRED/OFDA International Disaster Database, maintained by the Center for Research on
the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), Université Catholique de Louvain.11 These estimates are
in currency units and include both direct costs (such as damage to property, infrastructure, and
crops) and the indirect losses due to reductions in economic activity. Disaster damage estimates
are meant to correspond only to the year of the associated event, and not ongoing eﬀects that
11These data are available at <www.em-dat.net>.
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persist beyond the disaster year. I collapse these damage data to the country-year level. I also
use data on number of people killed and injured from EM-DAT.
The sources of disaster impact data in EM-DAT are varied, and include national governments,
UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and the
media. Active data collection for EM-DAT started in the late 1960s, and retrospective research
was necessary to record disasters prior to that date, stretching back to 1900 (Guha-Sapir, Hargitt,
and Hoyois 2004).
The outcome variables of interest in the empirical analysis will be various categories of net
international financial flows. The following come from the World Bank’s World Development In-
dicators 2004 (WDI 2004). Oﬃcial development assistance (ODA) is net bilateral disbursements
of loans and grants made on concessional terms to promote economic development in developing
countries, by members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). These figures
include oﬃcial aid to transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Both
emergency aid sent in the immediate aftermath of disasters and aid intended for more long-term
development initiatives are included in ODA. Lending from multilateral institutions is disburse-
ments of loans and credits minus repayments of principal. I calculate the sum of WDI 2004’s
separately-reported net financial flows (both concessional and non-concessional) from the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Associ-
ation (IDA), the IMF, and regional development banks (such as the Inter-American Development
Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the African Development Bank), and other multilateral
lenders reported in the World Bank’s Debtor Reporting System. Bank and trade-related lending
includes commercial bank lending and other private credits. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is
net inflows in the reporting country less net outflows by the reporting country of investment to ac-
quire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating
in an economy other than that of the investor. Portfolio investment encompasses transactions in
equity and debt securities, and excludes liabilities constituting foreign authorities’ reserves (LC-
FAR). Data on net flows of migrants’ remittances are from IMF Balance of Payments Statistics
2004, and are the sum of separately-reported items for workers’ remittances, compensation of
employees, and migrants’ transfers.12
The following adjustments are made to these data. All figures reported in currency amounts
12It is standard in studies of remittances to group these three categories together (see Ratha 2003). Workers’
remittances refer to transfers from persons abroad for a year or longer. Compensation of employees refers to
transfers from persons overseas for less than a year. Migrants’ transfers are transfers of financial assets by migrants
when moving from one country to another.
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are converted to 1995 US dollars using GDP deflators inWDI 2004 and the 1995 local currency/US
dollar exchange rate. To facilitate analysis of data across economies of vastly diﬀerent sizes, the
data on disaster damages and international financial flows will be expressed as fractions of GDP.
Because disasters may also aﬀect the denominator of these statistics (the level of GDP), I use
GDP in prior years as the denominator. In particular, because I will be interested in the eﬀects
of disaster damages up to 4 years before, I use mean GDP from 5, 6, and 7 years prior to a given
observation as the denominator for all damage and international flow variables. An analogous
adjustment is made for the number of people killed due to disasters, where the denominator is
mean population in the 5-7 years prior.
The sample for analysis includes developing countries with greater than one million popu-
lation.13 I also drop countries from the analysis for a given outcome variable if data for that
outcome is available for less than three years between 1970 and 2002 for that country. This
change does not aﬀect the empirical results, as the outcomes for countries that have only one or
two observations of non-missing data are entirely explained by the country fixed eﬀect and the
country-specific linear time trend. To maximize relevance for the samples for the main outcome
variables, in summary statistics tables I drop observations that lack suﬃcient data for inclusion
in any of the international flow outcome regressions.
The resulting samples contain between 1,501 and 2,275 observations, depending on the out-
come variable, and between 74 and 87 countries. The countries that actually experience hurricane
exposure during the time period are those listed in Table 2 with a non-zero mean storm index.
The remaining countries serve as controls, and primarily contribute to the estimates by improv-
ing the estimates of year fixed eﬀects. The panel is unbalanced, with the number of observations
varying across countries depending on data availability.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the observations included in the analyses. Summary
statistics for the storm index and storm damage are for all observations included in at least one
international flow regression. The storm index has a mean of 0.0014 and a standard deviation of
0.0140. Disaster damage as a percentage of GDP has a mean of 0.73%, and the mean in levels is
US$155 million. On average across country-year observations, 2.7 out of 100,000 inhabitants were
killed due to storms. ODA as a share of GDP has a mean of 7.51%, but in some countries this
figure is quite high: the 90th percentile of this variable is 18.69%. Other variables appear more
evenly distributed worldwide. The mean of migrants’ remittances as a share of GDP is 3.22%,
with a 90th percentile of 7.92%. Mean lending from international institutions as a percentage
13I calculate mean population from 1968-1972, or in the earliest 5-year period available.
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of GDP is 1.74%, and the corresponding means for bank and trade-related lending, FDI, and
portfolio investment are 1.02%, 1.75%, and 0.18%, respectively.
4.2 Mean impact of hurricane exposure across countries
To assess the average impact of hurricane exposure on country-level outcomes, I estimate the
following regression equation for an outcome Yjt in country j and year t:
Yjt = α1Hjt + α2Hjt−1 + α3Hjt−2 + α4Hjt−3 + α5Hjt−4 (4)
+γj + φtASIAj + χtLACj + ωtAFRj + δjTREND + εjt
Hjt is the storm index for country j and year t. Country fixed eﬀects γj control for time-
invariant diﬀerences across countries. Region-specific year eﬀects φt, χt and ωt allow for time-
varying factors common to all countries in the same region (ASIAj is a dummy variable for Asia,
LACj is a dummy variable for Latin America/Caribbean, and AFRj is a dummy variable for
Africa). TREND is a linear time trend. Country-specific time trends (δj, the country-specific
coeﬃcient on the time trend) help account for the eﬀect of slow-moving changes over time that
occur throughout the sample period, and that diﬀer across countries. εjt is a mean-zero error
term.
Serial correlation in the outcome variables is likely to be a problem in this panel dataset,
biasing OLS standard error estimates downward (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004)), so
standard errors allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance structure within countries (standard
errors are clustered by country).
The coeﬃcients of interest, α1 through α5, are the impacts of the storm indices in the current
year up to four years before (Hjt throughHjt−4) on current deviations from country-specific trends
in the dependent variable.
Table 4, Panel A presents results for estimation of equation (4) where the dependent variables
are the economic and human losses (as calculated from the EM-DAT database). Column 1 of the
table presents results for a regression where the dependent variable is damage as a share of GDP.
Greater hurricane exposure in the current year leads to higher storm damage. The coeﬃcient on
the storm index in the current year is positive and statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero at
the 5% level. The coeﬃcient on the current-year storm index (0.376) indicates that a 0.1 increase
in the storm index leads to storm damage amounting to 3.76 percent of GDP.
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Columns 2 and 3 of the table present results for regressions where the dependent variables
are number of people killed and number of people injured (respectively) as share of population.
Greater hurricane exposure in the current year leads to greater proportions of population killed
and injured. The coeﬃcients on the year 0 storm index in the killed and injured regressions are
statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The coeﬃcients
on the current-year storm indices in columns 2 and 3 indicate that a 0.1 increase in the storm
index leads on average to an additional 0.8 people killed and 1.4 people injured per 1,000,000
population. In columns 1 through 3 all of the coeﬃcients on the storm indices in years prior
to the current year (years -1 to -4) are substantially closer to zero, indicating that the largest
human and economic losses from storms tend to occur contemporaneously, rather than with a lag.
However, there is some evidence of a lagged eﬀect of storms on killed as fraction of population:
the coeﬃcient on the storm index in year -2 is positive and statistically significantly diﬀerent from
zero at the 5% level. Lagged eﬀects of storms perhaps reflect the weakening of structures and
disaster-recovery systems, so that losses from subsequent disasters are increased.
Subsequent results tables will present the impact of the mean storm index in years 0 to -3
on international financial flows.14 So for comparison, Panel B of Table 4 presents the impact of
the mean storm index in years 0 to -3 on the same outcome variables in Panel A, but where the
outcome variables are now also defined as means in years 0 to -3. The coeﬃcients on the mean
storm index are statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero (at the 5% level at least) for all three
outcome variables, and each is somewhat larger than the year 0 coeﬃcient in Panel A (because
now both current and lagged eﬀects of damages are captured).
Panel A of Table 5 presents results for regressions analogous to those in Panel A of Table 4,
but where the outcomes of interest are various types of international financial flows: oﬃcial de-
velopment assistance (ODA), migrants’ remittances, lending from multilateral institutions, bank
and trade-related lending, foreign direct investment, and portfolio investment. The results in col-
umn 1 indicate that ODA inflows respond positively to hurricane exposure. In that column, the
coeﬃcients on the storm index in years -1 through -3 are positive and statisitically significantly
diﬀerent from zero (all at the 10% level). Lending from multilateral institutions also responds
positively to hurricane exposure: the coeﬃcients on the storm index in years -2 and -3 are positive
and statisitically significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level. There is no evidence that, on
14This is simply the mean of the storm index in year 0 through year -3. In cases where the storm index is missing
in one or more of these years, the mean is taken over the non-missing observations (for this reason, regressions in
Panel B have slightly more observations than those in Panel A).
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average across all countries, the other types of international financial flows respond positively to
hurricane exposure. In columns 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the table, none of the coeﬃcients on the current
and lagged storm index variables are statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero.
Because of the existence of lagged eﬀects of hurricane exposure on international financial
inflows, it is of interest to examine the relationship between the mean hurricane exposure in
recent years on current financial flows. So Panel B of Table 5 presents regression results where
the dependent variables are exactly as in Panel A, but where the independent variable of interest
is the mean storm index in years 0 through -3. On average across all developing countries, mean
hurricane exposure in years 0 to -3 causes inflows of oﬃcial development assistance: the coeﬃcient
on the mean storm index in column 1 is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. In
each of the remaining columns, the coeﬃcient on the mean storm index is always substantially
smaller in magnitude than in the ODA regression (and sometimes negative) and is not statistically
significantly diﬀerent from zero.
4.3 Heterogeneity in impact of storms
The results in Tables 4 and 5 represent the mean impact of hurricane exposure across the de-
veloping countries in the dataset. It is also useful to understand heterogeneity in the eﬀects of
hurricane exposure that may be related to level of economic development, democratic institutions,
international political connectedness to major donor countries, and geographic location.
The basic strategy is to interact the mean storm index in years 0 to -3 with variables repre-
senting each of these dimensions of heterogeneity. The level of economic development is simply
per capita GDP in the initial period (the mean from 1968-1972), in thousands of 1995 US dol-
lars.15 Democratic institutions are represented by the Polity IV democracy index, which ranges
from 0 to 10. Connectedness to major donor countries is measured by an index of the similarity
of a country’s international political alliances to those of the five largest contributors of foreign
aid (USA, Japan, France, Britain, and Germany), as in Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992),
Bueno de Mesquita (1981), and Bueno de Mesquita (1985). Geographic location is captured
simply by a Latin American dummy variable and an African dummy variable (Asia being the
excluded category). Democratic institutions and alliance similarity are means in the 5-7 years
prior to the observation in question.
Coeﬃcient estimates on the mean storm index (years 0 to -3) and the associated interaction
15If data were not available on per capita GDP in 1968-1972, the mean was taken over the earliest subsequent
5-year period available.
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terms are presented in Table 6.16 In the first column, the dependent variable is mean disaster
damage in years 0 to -3. None of the coeﬃcient estimates on the interaction terms in that column
are statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero. There is no indication that there is important
heterogeneity in the impact of hurricanes on disaster damage along these dimensions.
In the remaining columns of the table, the dependent variables are the six types of international
financial flows previously examined. The most apparent pattern is that migrants’ remittances
respond less to hurricane exposure in richer countries: the coeﬃcient on the per capita GDP
interaction term is negative and statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level. The
interaction term with initial per capita income is also negative (but is not statistically significantly
diﬀerent from zero) in the other flow regressions. Another pattern that emerges (weakly) is that
the coeﬃcient on the democracy index interaction term is positive for all types of flows, but none
of these interaction terms are statistically significant at conventional levels. There does not seem
to be a strong pattern of heterogeneity related to alliance similarity: the interaction with alliance
similarity takes on various signs across regressions, and is never statistically significantly diﬀerent
from zero.
To the extent there are regional diﬀerences in the impact of storms on international financial
flows, they appear to be limited to Latin America. The Latin American interaction term is
positive and statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero (at the 10% level) in the regressions
for bank and trade-related lending and for portfolio investment. The coeﬃcient on the Latin
American interaction term is also positive (but not statistically significant) in the regressions for
remittances, lending from multilateral institutions, and FDI. The interaction term for Africa, on
the other hand, shows no obvious pattern: the coeﬃcient signs are both positive and negative,
and none are statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero.
4.4 Impact of hurricane exposure: richer vs. poorer countries
One of the most striking results in Table 6 was the negative coeﬃcient on the interaction term
between hurricane exposure and initial per capita GDP (particularly the statistically significant
coeﬃcient in the remittances regression). To further explore this particular dimension of hetero-
geneity, Table 7 presents the results from regressing international financial flows of various sorts
on the mean storm index, for subsamples of the data separated at median initial per capita GDP
16Main eﬀects for the democracy index and alliance similarity are also included in the regressions (coeﬃcients
not shown). Main eﬀects for the other interaction terms do not need to be included as they would be absorbed by
the country fixed eﬀects.
16
(the full set of fixed eﬀects and country-specific linear time trends remain in the regressions). Re-
sults for the richest half of countries are in Panel A, while those for the poorest half of countries
are in Panel B.
In each panel, the coeﬃcient on the mean storm index in years 0 to -3 is in the row labeled
"Reduced form". In the reduced form coeﬃcients in Panels A and B, the coeﬃcient on the mean
storm index in the ODA regression is positive and statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero
for both the richer and poorer subsamples (at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively). No other
reduced form coeﬃcient is statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero in the subsample of richer
countries, although the coeﬃcients in the regressions for bank and trade-related lending and for
FDI are actually negative and are not small in magnitude.
In the subsample of poorer countries (Panel B), the coeﬃcient on the mean storm index in
the remittances regression is also positive and is statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero at
the 1% level, while in the regression for bank and trade-related lending the coeﬃcient is negative
and statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level.
To gauge the magnitude of the financial inflows vis-a-vis the damages caused, a row labeled
"Instrumental variables (IV) estimates" presents coeﬃcient estimates on mean damage as a share
of GDP (in years 0 to -3), where damage is instrumented by the mean storm index in years 0 to
-3. The first-stage and OLS (uninstrumented) regressions corresponding to the IV regressions are
presented, respectively, in Appendix Tables 1 and 2.
In Appendix Table 1, each first-stage regression is accompanied by the F-statistic of the test
of the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcient on the instrument (mean storm index, years 0 to -3) is
equal to zero. In first-stage regressions for the richer country subsample (Panel A of Appendix
Table 1), the F-statistics range from 2.860 to 4.224, indicating that these are relatively weak
instruments (according to critical values reported in Stock and Yogo 2005). Therefore, the IV
results for the richer country subsample in Table 7 should be interpreted with caution.
By contrast, in the first-stage regressions for the poorer country subsample (Panel B of Ap-
pendix Table 1), the F-statistics are substantially larger, ranging from 25.101 to 135.751. Because
these F-statistics substantially exceed the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values, these are rel-
atively strong instruments and the accompanying IV estimates therefore should have attractive
size properties.
In Table 7, the coeﬃcient on mean damage as share of GDP (in years 0 to -3) in the IV regres-
sions should be interpreted as the fraction of damages replaced by the given type of international
flow in the disaster year and the three years that follow (a "replacement rate"). In the richer
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subsample (results in Panel A), positive and statistically significant coeﬃcients on the damage
variable indicate that increases in damage lead to increases in ODA and lending from multilateral
institutions. The point estimates indicate that 52.2 percent of damages are replaced by ODA,
and 12.2 percent of damages are replaced by lending from multilateral institutions within three
years following the damages. That said, the coeﬃcients on damages for the remaining types of
flows are all negative in sign, and the coeﬃcients on bank and trade-related lending and on FDI
are relatively large in magnitude (although none are statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero).
In the poorer subsample (results in Panel B), the results indicate that increases in damage
lead to increases in ODA and in migrants’ remittances (coeﬃcients on damage in these regressions
are positive and statistically significant), but to declines in bank and trade-related lending (the
coeﬃcient in this regression is negative and statistically significant). There is little indication
that other types of financial flows are aﬀected by disaster damage in this poorer subsample:
the coeﬃcients on damage in the remaining regressions are all small in magnitude and none are
statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero.
5 Discussion: magnitudes of the results
How large are the estimated eﬀects of hurricane exposure on international inflows? In particular,
how large are the responses of all international inflows combined relative to the damages caused
by hurricane exposure?
The replacement rate of disaster damages by some combination of international inflows is
simply the sum of coeﬃcients on mean damage across the corresponding IV regressions in of Table
7. Table 8 presents such sums of coeﬃcients for various combinations of flows (and corresponding
standard errors), separately for the richer and poorer country subsamples.
Of particular interest is the total replacement rate of disaster damages by all international
inflows combined, the sum of the coeﬃcients across columns 1 through 6. For the richer subsample,
the replacement rate by all flows is 0.167, but this figure is very imprecisely estimated (the
standard error is 0.507) so that the null hypothesis of zero replacement cannot be rejected. By
contrast, for the poorer subsample, the replacement rate by all flows combined is 0.755 (roughly
three-quarters), and this estimate is statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level.
Indeed, the null hypothesis of full replacement (a replacement rate of 1) cannot be rejected. All
told, then, there is strong evidence that international inflows replace disaster damages for the
poorer half of the sample, but not for the richer half.
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Examining the replacement rate for subcategories of flows yields additional insights. When
restricting attention to the two types of flows from "public" sources (the sum of ODA and lending
frommultilateral institutions), the replacement rate is positive and statistically significant for both
the richer and poorer country subsamples (at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively). Strikingly,
the estimated replacement rates are almost identical: 0.644 and 0.646 for the richer and poorer
subsamples, respectively.
Suggestive evidence of diﬀerences across the subsamples emerges when considering private
flows (the sum of remittances, bank and trade-related lending, FDI, and portfolio investment).
For the richer subsample, the sum of coeﬃcients is negative and large in magnitude (-0.477),
while for the poorer subsample the sum is positive and small in magnitude (0.109). However,
standard errors are large, so that neither sum is statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero. It
is apparently the large negative coeﬃcient sum across private flows that leads the sum across all
flows to be small in magnitude and statistically insignificant for the richer subsample.
6 Conclusion
Disasters exact a huge toll worldwide, both in terms of human casualties as well as economic losses.
Until now, however, there has been no systematic assessment of the extent to which international
resource flows help buﬀer countries from the losses they experience in the wake of disasters. This
paper fills this gap, focusing on hurricanes–one of the most common and destructive types of
disasters.
Using meteorological data on storm paths, I construct a storm index at the country-year
level that takes into account the fraction of a country’s population exposed to storms of varying
intensities. The analysis reveals striking diﬀerences across richer and poorer developing countries
in the responsiveness of international financial flows to hurricane exposure. Across developing
countries, greater hurricane exposure leads to large increases in foreign aid. For other types of
international financial flows, the impact of hurricanes varies according to income level. In the
poorer half of the sample, hurricane exposure also leads to substantial increases in migrants’
remittances, and a slightly oﬀsetting decline in bank and trade-related lending. For this poor-
country subsample, instrumental variables estimates indicate that total inflows from all sources
in the three years following hurricane exposure amount to roughly three-fourths of estimated
damages. In the richer half of the sample, by contrast, hurricane exposure stimulates inflows of
new lending from multilateral institutions, but oﬀsetting declines in private financial flows are so
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large that the null hypothesis of zero damage replacement cannot be rejected.
A key result of this paper is that the response of oﬃcial development assistance (foreign aid)
to hurricane exposure is large in magnitude, and the size of the response does not diﬀer greatly
across countries with varying levels of economic development, democratic institutions, political
connectedness to main donor countries, or geographic location. This result is perhaps surprising
in light of evidence in Alesina and Dollar (2000) that political and strategic considerations have
a large eﬀect on bilateral foreign aid flows. There is no necessary contradition between the two
papers, however. It very well may be that the level of foreign aid is influenced greatly by political
and strategic factors, even if aid’s responsiveness to disasters is not.
For other types of financial flows, this paper does document heterogeneity in responsiveness
to disasters. The poorer the country, the more do migrants’ remittances respond to hurricane
exposure. This heterogeneity may be due to these countries’ having larger migrant stocks in
the developed world, migrant stocks that are more prone to remit, or both. Other private flows
(commercial lending, FDI, and portfolio investment), actually decline in response to hurricane
exposure, and the declines appear larger in the richer half of the sample (although estimates are too
imprecise to make definitive statements). Declines in these other private flows following disasters
may reflect declines in rates of return or increased risk perceptions on the part of international
lenders and investors. However, these potential reasons behind heterogeneity in responsiveness of
the various private flows are just hypotheses at this point. I consider understanding the reasons
underlying heterogeneity in the impact of hurricane exposure on these private flows to be an
important area for future research.
More generally, this paper provides the first evidence that some types of international financial
flows help buﬀer countries from negative economic shocks. By contrast, related empirical work
in international finance to date typically concludes that there is little cross-country risk-sharing
and consumption smoothing. That said, this paper examines a specific kind of negative shock:
losses due to natural disasters. A possible explanation for the divergence between this paper’s
results from the rest of the international finance research on the topic is that disasters are highly
observable events, and that countries cannot influence the likelihood of experiencing one. There-
fore, international risk-sharing and consumption smoothing mechanisms in the wake of disasters
are not subject to moral hazard (unlike international mechanisms for dealing with, say, economic
fluctuations driven by poor macroeconomic policy). Valuable future work on this topic could use
an analogous instrumental variables approach to understand the impact of damages from other
types of disasters (such as earthquakes or droughts), to ascertain the generalizability of these
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results.
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1
Source: http://rsd.gsfc.nasa.gov/rsd/images/Mitch.html.
Figure 1 Hurricane Mitch approaching Honduras, October 26, 1998
2Source: Naval Pacific Meteorology and Oceanography Center/Joint Typhoon Warning Center. Link provided in Chu et al (2002) and available at 
<http://www.npmoc.navy.mil/jtwc/best_tracks/TC_bt_report.html>.
Figure 2 Western North Pacific best tracks, 1985
3Sources: Hurricane best track databases of the NOAA Tropical Prediction Center and the Naval Pacific Meteorology and Oceanography 
Center/Joint Typhoon Warning Center, processed using ArcGIS software.
Figure 3 Hurricane best tracks worldwide, 1970-2002
Table 1: Human losses and damages from natural disasters worldwide
1970-2002
Killed Injured Damage 
% of total 
damage
Type of disaster (000s) (000s) (1995 US$, 000s)
Drought 878 0 61,351,458 6.22%
Wind storm 612 520 280,019,414 28.38%
Earthquake 574 1,089 300,979,548 30.50%
Famine 232 0 71,798 0.01%
Flood 210 982 278,445,093 28.22%
Epidemic 154 80 1,450 0.00%
Volcano 26 8 5,514,201 0.56%
Earth slide 25 8 4,310,708 0.44%
Extreme temperature 21 10 27,589,390 2.80%
Wave / Surge 3 1 4,659 0.00%
Wild fire 1 2 28,244,056 2.86%
Insect infestation 0 0 251,002 0.03%
Total 2,737 2,701 986,782,776 100.00%
NOTES -- All figures are in thousands. Data are worldwide totals between 1970-2002 from 
EM-DAT: the OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, Université Catholique de 
Louvain, Brussels, Belgium. (Available at www.em-dat.net). Damage figures in EM-DAT 
converted to constant 1995 US dollars using GDP deflators and exchange rates from World 
Bank's World Development Indicators 2004. Disaster types in table sorted by number killed. 
"Wind storm" category includes phenomena variously referred to as cyclones, hurricanes, 
storms, tornadoes, tropical storms, typhoons, or winter storms.
Table 2: Mean storm index by country, 1970-2002
Region Country
Mean storm 
index
Caribbean Dominican Republic 0.020492
Caribbean Jamaica 0.012867
Caribbean Haiti 0.007932
Central America Mexico 0.001487
Central America Nicaragua 0.001431
Central America Honduras 0.001130
Central America Guatemala 0.000434
Central America El Salvador 0.000025
Central America Costa Rica 0.000001
Central America Panama 0
East Asia Korea, Rep. 0.004806
East Asia China 0.001606
East Asia Mongolia 0
Oceania Papua New Guinea 0.000003
South Asia Bangladesh 0.004568
South Asia India 0.000784
South Asia Sri Lanka 0.000308
South Asia Pakistan 0.000159
South Asia Nepal 0
Southeast Asia Philippines 0.028723
Southeast Asia Vietnam 0.006357
Southeast Asia Myanmar 0.001354
Southeast Asia Lao PDR 0.000413
Southeast Asia Thailand 0.000080
Southeast Asia Malaysia 0.000036
Southeast Asia Cambodia 0.000022
Southeast Asia Indonesia 0.000000
Southern Africa Madagascar 0.007182
Southern Africa Mozambique 0.001550
Southern Africa Zimbabwe 0.000062
Southern Africa Angola 0
Southern Africa Lesotho 0
Southern Africa Malawi 0
Southern Africa South Africa 0
Southern Africa Zambia 0
NOTES -- Rows of table sorted by region and mean storm index (mean over 1970-2002). 
Storm index is intensity-weighted events per capita in a given year, with squared 
windspeed as weight. Index is normalized: value of 1 means each inhabitant experiences 
a single hurricane at maximum windspeed observed over the time period. Sample of 
countries is developing countries with 1,000,000 or more population in 1968-1972. 
Hurricane data are from best track databases of the NOAA Tropical Prediction Center and 
the Naval Pacific Meteorology and Oceanography Center/Joint Typhoon Warning Center, 
processed using ArcGIS.
Table 3: Summary statistics, 1970-2002
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum 10th pctile. Median 90th pctile. Maximum Num. Obs.
Storm index, current year 0.0014 0.0140 0 0 0 0.00007 0.461 2,275        
Disaster damage (% of GDP) 0.73% 6.62% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.49% 171.88% 2,275
Disaster damage (1995 US$, 000s) 154,773 1,017,566 0 0 0 142,052 20,670,939 2,275
Killed (% of population) 0.0027% 0.0282% 0% 0% 0.0001% 0.0024% 0.8227% 2,275
Injured (% of population) 0.0036% 0.0505% 0% 0% 0% 0.0011% 1.4679% 2,275
Official development assistance (% of GDP) 7.51% 9.35% -0.78% 0.12% 3.97% 18.69% 96.13% 2,264
Migrants' remittances (% of GDP) 3.22% 10.24% -10.39% -1.11% 1.00% 7.92% 137.57% 1,501
Lending from multilateral institutions (% of GDP) 1.74% 2.41% -5.91% -0.11% 1.01% 4.71% 28.57% 2,163
Bank and trade-related lending (% of GDP) 1.02% 3.11% -14.10% -0.95% 0.05% 4.25% 34.99% 2,163
Foreign direct investment (% of GDP) 1.75% 3.61% -30.32% -0.02% 0.78% 5.04% 54.80% 1,761
Portfolio investment (% of GDP) 0.18% 3.26% -58.41% -0.33% 0.00% 1.24% 53.20% 1,742
NOTES-- The unit of observation is a country-year. Storm index is intensity-weighted events per capita in a given year, with squared windspeed as weight. 
Index is normalized: value of 1 means each inhabitant experiences a single hurricane at maximum windspeed observed over the time period. All 
international financial flows are net (inflows minus outflows); lending figures are new credits minus repayment of principal. For variables expressed as % of 
GDP, GDP in denominator is average of 5-7 years prior to observation. For number killed as % of population, population in denominator is average of 5-7 
years prior to observation. All other currency-denominated variables are in constant 1995 US dollars, including those used for % of GDP figures. Sources: 
IMF Government Finance Statistics; World Bank's World Development Indicators; EM-DAT International Disaster Database; hurricane best track databases 
of the NOAA Tropical Prediction Center and the Naval Pacific Meteorology and Oceanography Center/Joint Typhoon Warning Center.
Table 4: Impact of storms on economic and human losses, 1970-2002
(Fixed effects OLS estimates)
Panel A: Impact of storm index, years 0 to -4 separately
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Disaster damage as 
fraction of GDP
Killed as fraction of 
population
Injured as fraction of 
population
Coefficient on storm index:
   Year 0 0.376 0.000783 0.001356
(0.156)** (0.000202)*** (0.000582)**
   Year -1 0.028 0.000174 0.000413
(0.050) (0.000130) (0.000267)
   Year -2 0.037 0.000174 0.000238
(0.032) (0.000087)** (0.000225)
   Year -3 -0.001 0.000223 -0.000127
(0.023) (0.000181) (0.000407)
   Year -4 -0.003 0.000073 0.000151
(0.034) (0.000111) (0.000219)
Num. of obs. 2,227 2,227 2,227
R-squared 0.17 0.11 0.12
Panel B: Impact of mean storm index (years 0 to -3)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable (mean in years 
0 to -3): 
Disaster damage as 
fraction of GDP
Killed as fraction of 
population
Injured as fraction of 
population
Mean storm index, years 0 to -3 0.45 0.00116 0.001723
(0.197)** (0.000389)*** (0.000762)**
Num. of obs. 2,275 2,275 2,275
R-squared 0.52 0.3 0.3
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Unit of observation is a country-year. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 
country. All regressions include country fixed effects, year-region fixed effects (regions are "Latin 
America/Caribbean", "Asia", and "Africa"), and country-specific linear time trends. Damage is divided 
by mean GDP 5-7 years before. Killed and injured in storms are divided by mean population 5-7 
years before. See Table 3 for variable definitions and other notes. 
Table 5: Impact of storms on international financial flows to developing countries, 1970-2002
(Fixed effects OLS estimates)
Panel A: Impact of storm index, years 0 to -4 separately
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable (share of 
GDP): 
Official 
development 
assistance (ODA)
Migrants' 
remittances
Lending from 
multilateral 
institutions
Bank and trade-
related lending
Foreign direct 
investment
Portfolio 
investment
Coefficient on storm index:
   Year 0 0.059 0.013 -0.005 -0.02 -0.034 -0.027
(0.037) (0.015) (0.010) (0.022) (0.021) (0.028)
   Year -1 0.064 0.017 0.016 -0.028 -0.013 0.036
(0.034)* (0.019) (0.011) (0.023) (0.014) (0.039)
   Year -2 0.094 0.014 0.014 -0.041 -0.018 -0.011
(0.047)* (0.015) (0.006)** (0.033) (0.034) (0.029)
   Year -3 0.089 -0.015 0.03 -0.028 0.006 -0.008
(0.050)* (0.017) (0.015)** (0.023) (0.038) (0.025)
   Year -4 0.042 -0.008 -0.003 0.001 0.031 0.034
(0.028) (0.014) (0.012) (0.027) (0.039) (0.039)
Num. of obs. 2,220 1,465 2,119 2,119 1,713 1,694
R-squared 0.84 0.96 0.61 0.42 0.64 0.28
Panel B: Impact of mean storm index (years 0 to -3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable (share of 
GDP): 
Official 
development 
assistance (ODA)
Migrants' 
remittances
Lending from 
multilateral 
institutions
Bank and trade-
related lending
Foreign direct 
investment
Portfolio 
investment
Mean storm index, years 0 to -3 0.29 0.029 0.054 -0.115 -0.069 -0.022
(0.144)** (0.055) (0.033) (0.078) (0.085) (0.052)
Num. of obs. 2,264 1,501 2,163 2,163 1,761 1,742
R-squared 0.84 0.97 0.61 0.43 0.64 0.27
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Unit of observation is a country-year. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. All regressions include country fixed effects, 
year-region fixed effects (regions are "Latin America/Caribbean", "Asia", and "Africa"), and country-specific linear time trends. All dependent 
variables divided by mean GDP 5-7 years before. See Table 3 for variable definitions and other notes.
Table 6: Heterogeneity in impact of storms on international financial flows to developing countries, 1970-2002
(Fixed effects OLS estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable (share of GDP): Mean 
disaster 
damage, 
years 0 to -3
Official 
development 
assistance 
(ODA)
Migrants' 
remittances
Lending from 
multilateral 
institutions
Bank and 
trade-related 
lending
Foreign 
direct 
investment
Portfolio 
investment
Mean storm index, years 0-3 0.604 0.542 -0.399 0.263 -0.44 -0.537 -0.322
(1.123) (0.799) (0.863) (0.443) (0.387) (0.550) (0.615)
(Mean storm index, years 0-3) x 
   (Per capita GDP, 1968-1972, 0.131 -0.031 -0.308 -0.118 -0.127 -0.023 -0.163
      000s of 1995 US$) (0.204) (0.290) (0.118)** (0.123) (0.117) (0.189) (0.098)
(Mean storm index, years 0-3) x 
   (Polity IV democracy index, 0.05 0.045 0.035 0.04 0.04 0.028 0.023
      5-7 years before) (0.051) (0.064) (0.032) (0.034) (0.026) (0.046) (0.026)
(Mean storm index, years 0-3) x 
   (Alliance similarity with US, Japan, France, -5.631 -2.631 4.889 -1.631 0.851 2.14 1.836
      Britain, and West Germany, 5-7 years before) (4.522) (3.050) (4.150) (1.946) (1.562) (2.394) (2.956)
(Mean storm index, years 0-3) x -0.021 -0.077 0.532 0.119 0.426 0.212 0.457
   (Latin America dummy) (0.536) (0.284) (0.441) (0.165) (0.234)* (0.247) (0.260)*
(Mean storm index, years 0-3) x -0.577 1.218 1.42 -0.458 0.656 -0.688 0.729
   (Africa dummy) (1.181) (1.632) (1.104) (0.482) (0.422) (1.320) (0.628)
Num. of obs. 2,111 2,100 1,419 1,999 1,999 1,647 1,636
R-squared 0.52 0.85 0.97 0.62 0.41 0.55 0.28
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Unit of observation is a country-year. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. All regressions include country fixed effects, 
year-region fixed effects (regions are "Latin America/Caribbean", "Asia", and "Africa"), and country-specific linear time trends. All dependent 
variables divided by mean GDP 5-7 years before. "Alliance similarity" captures extent to which country had similar international alliances with USA, 
Japan, France, Britain, and Germany. Polity IV democracy index ranges from 0 to 10 (10 is most democratic). Main effects for democracy index and 
alliance similarity also included in regressions (coefficients not shown). See Table 3 for variable definitions and other notes.
Table 7: Impact of storms and disaster damage on international financial flows, separately for 
richer and poorer developing countries
1970-2002
(Reduced form and IV estimates)
Panel A: Countries above median initial per capita GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable (share of GDP): Official 
development 
assistance 
(ODA)
Migrants' 
remittances
Lending from 
multilateral 
institutions
Bank and trade-
related lending
Foreign direct 
investment
Portfolio 
investment
Reduced form: 
  Coefficient on mean storm index, 0.22 -0.013 0.052 -0.091 -0.058 -0.027
     years 0 to -3 (0.120)* (0.060) (0.035) (0.082) (0.098) (0.064)
Num. of obs. 1,133 763 1,035 1,035 932 942
R-squared 0.81 0.91 0.45 0.52 0.71 0.29
Instrumental variables (IV) estimates:
  Coefficient on mean damage 0.522 -0.033 0.122 -0.214 -0.16 -0.07
      as share of GDP, years 0 to -3 (0.098)*** (0.134) (0.043)*** (0.287) (0.359) (0.150)
Num. of obs. 1,133 763 1,035 1,035 932 942
Panel B: Countries at or below median initial per capita GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable (share of GDP): Official 
development 
assistance 
(ODA)
Migrants' 
remittances
Lending from 
multilateral 
institutions
Bank and trade-
related lending
Foreign direct 
investment
Portfolio 
investment
Reduced form: 
  Coefficient on mean storm index, 0.72 0.296 -0.025 -0.117 0.027 0.005
     years 0 to -3 (0.323)** (0.109)*** (0.057) (0.048)** (0.087) (0.032)
Num. of obs. 1,066 723 1,063 1,063 799 779
R-squared 0.82 0.98 0.66 0.36 0.49 0.34
Instrumental variables (IV) estimates:
  Coefficient on mean damage 0.669 0.198 -0.024 -0.108 0.016 0.003
      as share of GDP, years 0 to -3 (0.351)* (0.093)** (0.054) (0.033)*** (0.052) (0.019)
Num. of obs. 1,066 723 1,063 1,063 799 779
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Unit of observation is a country-year. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. All regressions include country 
fixed effects, year-region fixed effects (regions are "Latin America/Caribbean", "Asia", and "Africa"), and country-specific linear time 
trends. All dependent variables divided by mean GDP 5-7 years before. Total number of observations across richer and poorer 
subsamples is lower than in previous tables because initial per capita GDP is not available for Myanmar. See Table 3 for variable 
definitions and other notes.
Table 8: Replacement rate of disaster damage by international financial flows, separately for richer and poorer developing countries
1970-2002
Panel A: Countries above median initial per capita GDP
All flows Flows from governments and 
international institutions (ODA, lending 
from multilateral institutions)
Flows from private sources 
(remittances, bank and trade-related 
lending, FDI, portfolio investment)
Replacement rate 0.167 0.644 -0.477
(Standard error) (0.507) (0.107)*** (0.495)
Panel B: Countries at or below median initial per capita GDP
All flows Flows from governments and 
international institutions (ODA, lending 
from multilateral institutions)
Flows from private sources 
(remittances, bank and trade-related 
lending, FDI, portfolio investment)
Replacement rate 0.755 0.646 0.109
(Standard error) (0.373)** (0.356)* (0.111)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Replacement rates are inflows as fraction of disaster damages, calculated as sum of instrumental variables (IV) coefficients in Table 
7 for corresponding flows.
Appendix Table 1: Impact of storms on disaster damage, separately for richer and poorer developing countries
                (first stage of IV regressions of Table 7)
1970-2002
(Fixed effects OLS estimates)
Panel A: Countries above median initial per capita GDP
Dependent variable: Mean damage in years 0 to -3 (as share of GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample is observations with non-
missing data on:
Official 
development 
assistance 
(ODA)
Migrants' 
remittances
Lending from 
multilateral 
institutions
Bank and trade-
related lending
Foreign direct 
investment
Portfolio 
investment
  Coefficient on mean storm index, 0.422 0.405 0.426 0.426 0.366 0.39
     years 0 to -3 (0.205)** (0.205)* (0.210)** (0.210)** (0.216)* (0.200)*
 F-stat: signif. of storm variable 4.224 3.923 4.115 4.115 2.860 3.776
 P-value 0.046 0.056 0.05 0.05 0.098 0.059
Num. of obs. 1,133 763 1,035 1,035 932 942
R-squared 0.4 0.61 0.39 0.39 0.62 0.62
Panel B: Countries at or below median initial per capita GDP
Dependent variable: Mean damage in years 0 to -3 (as share of GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample is observations with non-
missing data on:
Official 
development 
assistance 
(ODA)
Migrants' 
remittances
Lending from 
multilateral 
institutions
Bank and trade-
related lending
Foreign direct 
investment
Portfolio 
investment
  Coefficient on mean storm index, 1.075 1.498 1.075 1.075 1.666 1.693
     years 0 to -3 (0.215)*** (0.221)*** (0.214)*** (0.214)*** (0.150)*** (0.145)***
 F-stat: signif. of storm variable 25.101 45.753 25.200 25.200 123.855 135.751
 P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Num. of obs. 1,066 723 1,063 1,063 799 779
R-squared 0.65 0.84 0.65 0.65 0.72 0.74
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Unit of observation is a country-year. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. All regressions include country 
fixed effects, year-region fixed effects (regions are "Latin America/Caribbean", "Asia", and "Africa"), and country-specific linear time 
trends. See Table 3 for variable definitions and other notes.
Appendix Table 2: Impact of disaster damage on international financial flows, separately for 
                  richer and poorer developing countries (OLS analog to IV regressions of Table 7)
1970-2002
(Ordinary least-squares estimates)
Panel A: Countries above median initial per capita GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable (share of GDP): Official 
development 
assistance 
(ODA)
Migrants' 
remittances
Lending from 
multilateral 
institutions
Bank and trade-
related lending
Foreign direct 
investment
Portfolio 
investment
  Coefficient on mean damage 0.11 0.012 0.027 0.127 0.087 -0.034
      as share of GDP, years 0 to -3 (0.041)** (0.114) (0.016)* (0.060)** (0.069) (0.055)
Num. of obs. 1,133 763 1,035 1,035 932 942
R-squared 0.82 0.91 0.45 0.52 0.71 0.29
Panel B: Countries at or below median initial per capita GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable (share of GDP): Official 
development 
assistance 
(ODA)
Migrants' 
remittances
Lending from 
multilateral 
institutions
Bank and trade-
related lending
Foreign direct 
investment
Portfolio 
investment
  Coefficient on mean damage 0.127 -0.091 0.052 -0.007 0.018 -0.006
      as share of GDP, years 0 to -3 (0.052)** (0.043)** (0.018)*** (0.013) (0.058) (0.014)
Num. of obs. 1,066 723 1,063 1,063 799 779
R-squared 0.82 0.98 0.66 0.35 0.49 0.34
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Unit of observation is a country-year. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. All regressions include country 
fixed effects, year-region fixed effects (regions are "Latin America/Caribbean", "Asia", and "Africa"), and country-specific linear time 
trends. All dependent variables divided by mean GDP 5-7 years before. See Table 3 for variable definitions and other notes.
